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ABSTRACT
This research examined the relationship between the scarcity-
uunificence of organizational environments and the occurrence of illegal
acts. It was hypothesized that the less munificent is the organization's
environment the more effort the organization will exert to obtain re-
sources from the environment, and, thus, the more likely it will engage in
legally questionable behavior. Analyses of company and industry data for
firms cited for unfair market practices and restraint of trade activities
provided support for the hypothesis.

The Scarcity-Munificence Component
of Organizational Environments and the Commission
of Illegal Acts
Recently, there has been a substantial increase in theory and
research on the interaction of the organization and environment (e.g.,
Cyert and March, 1963; Emery and Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967; Terreberry,
1968; Pfeffer, 1972; Duncan, 1972; Starbuck, 1974). One focus of analysis
has been the adaptation of the organization to the environment (Burns and
Stalker, 1961; Bennis, 1966; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In this work,
the environment has generally been treated as a constraint or problematic
element with which the organization must deal in order to be effective or
increase its chances of survival. The interaction of the uncertainty com-
ponent of the environment and the structural component of the organization
has been of particular concern, and it has been widely posited that there
exists an optimal fit between structure and environment (e.g., Lorsch and
Lawrence, 1969; Galbraith, 1973).
A second focus of analysis has emphasized the organization's ability
to control or change its environment. In addition to adapting its own
structures to the environment, several theorists (Cyert and March, 1963;
Starbuck, 1965; Thompson, 1967) have noted that organizations may act on
their environments in order to reduce uncertainty. Thompson (1967), for
example, noted that organizations may make their environments less uncer-
tain by engaging in long-term contracts with other organizations (Macauley,
1961) , by absorbing elements of the environment into the organization
(Selznick, 1949), by seeking external support for the organization within
the environment (Litwak and Hyton, 1962; Zald, 1970), or by forming tem-
porary coalitions or joint ventures with other organizations (Aiken and

Hage, 1968). Similarly, Pfeffer (1972) has shown that the uncertainty associ-
ated with external resources may be substantially reduced through interfirm
merger.
To date, most of the theoretical work on the interaction of the organi-
zation and environment has focused on the uncertainty element of the environ-
ment. However, environmental uncertainty has been conceptualized in several
different ways. Thompson (1967) , Perrow (1970) , and Pfeffer (1972) have
considered organizational dependence upon external resources as an important
source of uncertainty and one which the organization strives to reduce. Duncan,
on the other hand, has followed Emery and Trist (1963) and Terreberry (1968)
in delineating two separate components of environmental uncertainty: the
simple-complex dimension and the static-dynamic dimension. Duncan found that
individuals in decision units with dynamic-complex environments perceive the
greatest amount of uncertainty in decision-making, but that the static-
dynamic dimension accounts for a substantially greater proportion of the
variance than does the simple-complex dimension.
Although environmental uncertainty is no doubt the most heavily researched
factor in the interaction between organization and environment, it is not the
only aspect of the environment relevant to this interaction. One factor which
is sometimes referred to in theoretical discussions, but is rarely included in
empirical research on organizations is scarcity-munificence of the environment.
March and Simon (1958) , probably the first organizational theorists to specifi-
cally build this environmental dimension into a theoretical model, were primarily
concerned with the effect of environmental munificence on intra-organizational
conflict. They posited that when resources are restricted from the environ-
ment, relations among individual members and subgroups within the organiza-
tion will resemble a purely competitive or zero-sum game. However, when

organizations function within a benign or munificent environment, the organi-
zation need not resolve the relative merits of subgroup claims to resources.
Therefore, following March and Simon (x958) , it can be posited that scarcity-
munificence of the environment may have important effects upon several intra-
organizational processes: interpersonal and intergroup conflict, differentia-
tion of individual and subgroup goals, felt need for joint decision making.
The scarcity-munificence component of the environment may also be an
important determinant of organizational actions in the environment. Pre-
viously, Starbuck (1965) has noted that organizations seek to grow^ in part,
to make their environments more munificent. Also, Cyert and March (1963)
have considered environmental munificence to be a factor which interacts
with the accumulation of slack resources to insure organizational stability
and survival. However, neither Cyert and March (1963) nor Starbuck (1965)
have considered environmental scarcity-munificence as an independent vari-
able which directly affects the actions of organizations in the environment.
Even Hass and Drabek (1973) , who have extensively reviewed the sources of
organizational stress and reactions to them, have omitted the scarcity-munifi-
cence component of the environment as a determinant of organizational action.
Thus, there is a clear need for both theoretical and empirical research on the
affects of environmental munificence on organizational action in the environ-
ment.
In the research reported here it was posited that the scarcity-munifi-
cence of an organization's environment would be associated with organizational
actions designed to procure additional resources. Organizations must import
resources from their environments in order to function (Katz and Kahn, 1967)
,
and regardless of whether there exists organizational goals of survival and

growth or individual performance goals of key organizational members, it is
clear that resources must be inputted from the environment. It is therefore
hypothesized that the less muni fice t is the organization's environment, the
more effort the organization will exert to obtain resources from its environ-
ment.
The effort to procure resources may no doubt take many forms, but one
of its most interesting and important outcroppings (from a societal point of
view) is the commission of illegal acts. When the organization is located
within a scarce environment, one method of coping with intra- and extra-
organizational demands may be to perform activities which are legally ques-
tionable. Specifically, it is predicted that the more scarce is the environ-
ment of a business organization, the more likely it will engage in activities
which are considered unfair market practices or restraint of trade. It is
hypothesized that such trade violations may be undertaken by the organiza-
tion within a scarce environment in order to procure additional resources.
When the organization is in a munificent environment, it is more likely to
obtain sufficient resources without resorting to illegal practices.
Design of the Research
The overall goal of the research was to test the relationship between
the scarcity-munificence component of the environment and the occurrence of
illegal corporate acts. In order to assemble a sample of organizations which
had committed legally questionable behavior, the authors consulted the published
volume, Trade Cases . This publication reports the decisions, consent and
litigated decrees entered in Federal and State courts throughout the United
States for cases involving antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission
Act. For the years 1968 to 1972 a sample was constructed of all publically
held companies involved in the following areas of litigation: price discrimi-
nation, tying arrangements, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, franchise

violation, price fixing, foreclosure of entry, reciprocity, allocation of
markets, monopoly, conspiracy, and illegal mergers and acquisitions. Sampled
companies included firms found guil y in litigated cases, firms which were
a party to (nonlitigated) consent decrees, and unsettled cases in which the
court found substantial merit to the case? against the cited firm. In order
to facilitate the use of published data and to provide a control for size,
the final sample was restricted to companies listed by Fortune as one of the
500 largest firms in the United States. The final sample thus consisted of
105 large companies involved in trade litigation from 1968 to 1972.
In order to measure the degree of scarcity-munificence of the organi-
zation's environment, two approaches were taken. First, as an indirect
measure of environmental munificence, the financial performance of the cited
firms was contrasted to that of all firms in the Fortune 500 . Since the
performance of individual firms should be correlated with the scarcity-
munificence of its environment, a comparison of financial performance be-
tween cited firms and all firms in the Fortune 500 would be relevant to the
hypothesis. Second, as a more direct measure of the relationship between
environmental munificence and the ccaimission of illegal acts, the financial
performance of the industries in which the cited firms operated was contrasted
to the financial performance of all firms (and industries) in the Fortune
500 . Finally, firm and industry statistics were compared in order to ob-
serve whether cited firms differed from other firms in their industries.
Five years of financial data were collected (from Fortune) for each
company in the sample. Since it was hypothesized that environmental munifi-
cence is a factor influencing the commission of illegal acts, financial data
was collected for each of five years preceding the date that a formal com-
plaint was filed by either a governmental or civil party against the firm.

Because the sample was constructed from 1968-1972 Trade Cases, the bulk of
the financial data was collected for the years 1963-1971. However, it was
necessary that some of the company data be collected from earlier years
(i.e., 1954-1962) in order that the five-year's data precede some long-
standing trade complaints.
The financial performance of the cited firms was measured by the mean
return on equity and mean return on sales over the five years preceding a
trade complaint. Mean returns on equity and sales were also recorded for
the cited firm's industry and for all firms in the Fortune 500 during these
years. Special attention was given to the weighting of industry and all
firms' means so that they would exactly correspond to the proportion of
individual firms cited for illegal activities in the years under study.
That is, since data from individual firms spanned 5-year periods from 1954-
195 8 to 1967-1971, it was necessary to compute means for their industries
and all firms in the Fortune 500 which would properly reflect these time
periods. Thus, for each observation of an illegal corporate act, five pre-
ceding years of data were collected for the individual firm, its industry,
and all firms in the Fortune 500 . These data were subsequently averaged and
prepared for comparison. Because of the temporal correspondence of the data,
statistical analyses could subsequently be performed in which an average of
individual firm data could be considered to be a sample mean drawn from a
known population of all firms in the Fortune 500 or their industries.
Two other measures of financial performance were provided by Fortune
but were more difficult to interpret: the percentage change in sales
and percentage change in profits. These data were considered to be less
valid indicators of financial performance than the return on equity and
return on sales data, since the mean percentage change (over the relevant

five-year period) may be highly correlated with the variability of a firm's
performance. That is, if a firm showed alternate declines and advances in
profits, the average percentage change would be a large increase (e.g., a
50% decline becomes a 100% increase in returning to the original level)
.
In order to minimize this bias, only the median industry ranks (as reported
in Fortune) for change in sales and change in profits over the five years
were used in the analyses. Although bias is not eliminated in these analyses,
it is reduced due to the greater stability of industry over individual company
data and the greater stability of median ranks over percentage change data.
The change in sales arclprof its indicators will thus serve as supplementary
data to the return on equity and return on sales measures of financial
performance .
Results
Table 1 shovs the mean return on equity and the mean return on sales
for the cited firms and all firms in the Fortune 500 . Since the sample was
drawn from a population with kncwnnean and variance, the Z_ statistic was
used to compare the two means. As predicted, the data showed that, for the
five years preceding a trade complaint, the financial performance of cited
firms was significantly below all firms in the Fortune 500 on both mean
return on equity (Z = -4.24, p<.001, one-tailed) and mean return on sales
(Z = -1.70, p < .05, one-tailed)
.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Table 1 also shows the contrast between the financial performance of
all firms in the Fortune 500 and the industries in which the cited firms
operated. Since the industry statistics published by Fortune are based

only on the 500 firms in their yearly sample, the population mean for "all
firms" is also the population mean of all the industries delineated by
Fortune . Thus, a Z_ statistic was again used in contrasting the sample mean
for cited industries versus the population mean of all firms. As shown in
the table, the financial performance of the cited industries was significantly
below that of all firms in the Fortune 500 . The difference was highly
significant on both the mean return on equity (Z = -11.10, p< .001, one-
tailed) and the mean return on sales (Z = -4.98, p<-001, one-tailed). It
should be noted that the sample of observations for the cited industries
was smaller than the sample of observations for cited firms in that some
2firms could not be assigned unambiguously to an industry. This loss of
cases also accounts for the slight difference in the weighted averages of
return on sales and return on equity for all Fortune 500 firms. Each
missing case required the removal of its five-year time period from the
weighting of the population means for "all firms."
In addition to the comparison of cited firms and industries to the
means for all firms, Table 1 also shows the contrasts between cited firms
and their industries. As shown in the Table, the financial performance
of the cited firms was neither better nor worse than the average performance
of its industry. There was no statistically significant difference between
cited firms and their industries on mean return on equity (Z = -.78, N.S.)
nor mean return on sales (Z = .70, N.S.) . In these analyses, the industry
data represent the population from which the cited firms were drawn.
Table 2 provides additional data on the comparison of cited industries
to all firms in the Fortune 500 . In the table are shown percentiles of
financial performance for all the cited industries. Since the number of
industries delineated by Fortune changed during the time periods over which

data were collected, it was necessary to convert industry ranks (as presented
by Fortune) to percentile scores. Table 2 thus represents percentiles convert-
ed from the median rank of cited industries for return on equity, return on
sales, change in sales, and change in profits. As shown in the table, the
cited industries were rated below average on each of the four financial
indicators. On three of these indicators (mean return on equity, change in
sales, change in profits) there was a highly significant difference between
the average percentile for the cited industry and that which would be expect-
ed by chance (all Z scores > 3.27; p < .001, one-tailed test) . On the mean
return on sales indicator there was a marginally significant (Z = 1.52;
p < .07, one-tailed) difference between the average percentile for the cited
industries and that expected by chance. The inferior performance of cited
industries was also evidenced by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Siegal,
p. 47-52) of the distribution of percentile scores. As shown in the table,
the distribution of percentile scores for the cited industries differed
3
significantly from the distribution which would be expected by chance.
Insert Table 2 About Here
Discussion
The data provided by this study offer support for the hypothesis that
environmental munificence influences the commission of illegal acts. As
shown in the comparisons of Table 1, cited companies performed less well
than other firms in the Fortune 500 over the five years preceding a trade •
complaint. Although this difference in performance could have been due to
factors either internal or external to the firm, the evidence weighs in favor
of environmental factors. First, it is important to note that while cited
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firms performed below the average of all Fortune 500 firms, they performed
no worse than other firms in their industries. In contrast, the industries
in which cited firms operated displayea financial performance far below the
average for all industries. Thus, it appears that the reason cited firms per-
formed below the average for all Fortune 500 firms is not because of internal
organizational factors (e.g. poor management, internal structure), but because
of factors common to the entire industry. The industries in which cited firms
operated were low performing and may have been beset with industry-wide prob-
lems such as poor demand for a given class of products, shortages of raw
materials or widespread strikes. Although it is difficult to ascertain the
exact problem facing each of these industries, it is relatively clear that
the industrial environments of the companies cited for illegal acts were less
munificent than those of other companies in the Fortune 500 .
It was broadly hypothesized that organizations with scarce environments
would take actions to procure additional resources. It was also hypothesized
that increased efforts to procure resources would increase the likelihood of
committing illegal actions. The scope of such illegal behavior is beyond the
purposes of this research, but environmental scarcity does appear to be related
to a range of trade violations. Table 3 shows the mean difference in performance
between cited industries and all firms broken down by type of trade offense.
As shown in the table, there appears to be a good deal of consistency in
the data across the trade offenses. With few exceptions, the cited industries
performed below all firms in return on equity and return on sales.
Insert Table 3 About Here
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It is interesting to note that many of the trade violations listed
in Table 3 have been described by other authors (e.g., Cyert and March 1963;
Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer, 1972) as ways for an organization to reduce
uncertainty. Actions such as price fixing, reciprocity, mergers and acquisi-
tions are modes by which the organization can control its market environment.
However, it should be stressed that these actions are also ways by which an
organization may extract additional resources from its environment. For the
types of trade violations investigated in this research, the environment of the
cited firms was generally shown to be less munificent than that of other
Fortune 500 firms. Therefore, it seems conceptually more valid to consider
these organizational actions as not just ways to reduce uncertainty but as
modes of resource procurement. In fact, we would contend that many actions
which have previously been identified as evidence for the primacy of
uncertainty reduction by organizations (e.g., reciprocity agreements,
joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions) may also represent organizational
attempts to glean additional resources from the environment
.
Conclusion
Although the data of this research provide support for the hypothesis that
scarcity-munifience of an organization's environment influences the commission
of illegal acts, the present results do not of course unequivocably support a
causal statement. Nonetheless, efforts were made in this research to measure
the independent variable (environmental munificence) on time periods preceding
the dependent variable (commission of illegal acts) . This method provided an
improvement over covariation measured within a single time frame, although
further time-series data on both financial performance and trade violations
would be necessary to fully substantiate a causal hypothesis (see Staw, 1975
for additional discussion of problems in interpreting cross-sectional research)
.

12
An archival analysis of organizational phenomena such as that utilized
in this study inherently has certain strengths and weaknesses. The primary
advantages of archival analysis lie in the non-reactivity of measurement
(Webb, et al
.
, 1966} and the relative low cost of getting data from a wide
number of organizations. The primary disadvantage of archival research, of
course, lies in the rigidity of the data base. Archival data may not be
available on critical variables or data that is available may not be suitable
for statistical analyses. Even with these liabilities, however, research in
the organizational area has only barely touched the potential pool of useful
archival data on the internal behavior of formal organizations or the actions
of organizations in their environments.
Certainly, as shown in this study, there is need for much additional
research on the effects of the scarcity-munificence component of the environ-
ment. Little is known about the organization's reactions to environmental
scarcity and how these differ from organizational actions within a munificent
environment. For example, illegal actions may be only one means by which an
organization attempts to procure resources from a scarce environment, and
even this method of coping with the environment may be limited to powerful
organizations or those operating within environments resembling an oli-
gopolistic market structure (Stigler, 1964) . Caution must therefore be
exercised in generalizing the relationship between environmental munificence
and illegal behavior on the part of large Fortune 500 firms to smaller and
not-for-profit organizations. Instead of an increase in reciprocity, price-
fixing and other restraint of trade activities, a scarce environment could
lead to intense interfirm competition when the market consists of numerous
small firms (as under perfect competition) . Thus, when the organization
initially lacks sufficient power over its environment or if the organization
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set (Evan, 1966) is too large or diverse to permit effective coordination of
behavior, intensification of competition could be the organization's best
way to procure additional resources. The scarcity-munificence component of
the environment, then, may interact with organizational power or inter-
organizational relations in determining an organization's actions to procure
environmental resources.
In addition to research on the influence of scarcity-munificence on
organizational actions in the environment, further research should also be
directed toward the effect of this environmental factor upon the internal
dynamics of organizations. The intra-organizational consequences of
environmental scarcity could, as noted by Hermann (1963) , be related to those
of other organizational crises. Environmental scarcity, for example, may lead
to centralization of authority, restriction of communication channels (Hermann,
1963) , as well as increases in intra-organizational conflict resulting from
internal budgeting processes (Pondy, 1964, 1969) . It is hoped that this study
will stimulate further research on the intra-organizational consequences of a
given level of environmental scarcity in addition to the influence of scarcity-
munificence on organizational efforts to procure additional resources from the
environment.
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Footnotes
The authors would like to thank Greg R. Oldham and Louis R. Pondy for their
comments on this manuscript.
2
In addition, some industry classifications were not used by Fortune during
the period over which company financial data were collected.
3The test statistic (Dmax) for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reflects the
maximum difference between the actual and expected cumulative distributions
for a sample. However, since percentile scores were converted from median
rank data, the expected distribution of percentiles may not be perfectly
rectangular. That is, because medians are less likely to be extreme than
raw scores, the occurence of each percentile would not have an expected
probability of 1/100. Thus, in order to solve this problem, the expected
frequency distributions were calculated exactly by taking into consideration
all possible median values that could result from the "all firms" popula-
tion data.
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TABLE 1
Comparisons of the Financial Performance
of Cited Firms, Their Industries,
and All Firms in Fortune 500
19
Comparison I Cited Firms Ail Firms P*
Mean Return X = 9.67 u = 11.45
on Equity (n = 105) (n = 500)
(range = -5.98 to 24.56) (range = 10.16 to 12.46)
-4.24 001
Mean Return X = 5.46 u = 6.03 -1.70 .05
on Sales (n = 105) (n = 500)
(range = -1.31 to 17.91) (range = 5.40 to 6.38)
Comparison II Cited Industries All Firms P*
Mean Return
on Equity
X = 9.85
(n = 92)
(range « 7.40 to 12.98)
u - 11.47^
(n = 500)
(range = 10.16 to 12.46)
-11.10 .001
Mean Return
on Sales
X = 5.12
(n - 92)
(range = 2.58 to 10.90)
u = 6.05
(n = 500)
(range = 5.40 to 6.38)
-4.98 001
Comparison III Cited Firms Cited Industries p**
Mean Return X = 9.50 u = 9.85
on Equity (n = 92) (n = 92)
(range = -5.98 to 24.56) (range = 7.40 to 12.98)
-.78 N.S.
Mean Return
on Sales
X = 5.36
(n = 92)
(range = -1.31 to 16.82)
u = 5.12
(n = 92)
(range = 2.58 to 10.90)
70 N.S,
* one-tailed tests
** two-tailed tests
a
population mean derived from 105 observations
b
population mean derived from 92 observations
note: range scores are based upon average financial performance over five years
preceding trade complaint.
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TABLE 3
Mean Difference in Performance Between Cited Industries and All Firms
in Return on Equity and Return on Sales by Type of Offense
Type of Trade Offense Return on Equity Return on Sales
Price Fixing
Reciprocity
Mergers and
Acquisitions
Refusal to Deal
Monopoly
Tying Arrangements
Price Discrimination
Allocation of
Markets
Other (forclosure of
entry, exclusive
dealing and con-
spiracy)
-i .98
(n = 42)
-1
.78
(n ~ 22)
-1
.36
(n = 17)
-1
.55
(n = 10)
-1
.28
(n = 7)
-.!38
(n = 4)
1
.49
(n = 4)
•1
.52
(n - 2)
.(37
(n = 5)
-.92
(n - 42)
-1.94
(n = 22)
-1.39
(n = 17)
1.05
(n = 10)
-.49
(n 7)
-2
.39
(n - 4)
-1,.43
(n = 4)
1.98
(n 2)
•1.94
(n 5)
1
The total number of complaints in the table exceeds the total number
of cases of cited industries, since some trade complaints involved more
than one type of offense.
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